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Abstract
Brown-headed gulls (Larus brunnicephalus), winter visitors of Thailand, were tracked by satellite telemetry during 2008–2011
for investigating their roles in the highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5N1 virus spread. Eight gulls negative for
influenza virus infection were marked with solar-powered satellite platform transmitters at Bang Poo study site in Samut
Prakarn province, Thailand; their movements were monitored by the Argos satellite tracking system, and locations were
mapped. Five gulls completed their migratory cycles, which spanned 7 countries (China, Bangladesh, India, Myanmar,
Thailand, Cambodia, and Vietnam) affected by the HPAI H5N1 virus. Gulls migrated from their breeding grounds in China to
stay overwinter in Thailand and Cambodia; while Bangladesh, India, Myanmar, and Vietnam were the places of stopovers
during migration. Gulls traveled an average distance of about 2400 km between Thailand and China and spent 1–2 weeks
on migration. Although AI surveillance among gulls was conducted at the study site, no AI virus was isolated and no H5N1
viral genome or specific antibody was detected in the 75 gulls tested, but 6.6% of blood samples were positive for pan-
influenza A antibody. No AI outbreaks were reported in areas along flyways of gulls in Thailand during the study period.
Distance and duration of migration, tolerability of the captive gulls to survive the HPAI H5N1 virus challenge and days at
viral shedding after the virus challenging suggested that the Brown-headed gull could be a potential species for AI spread,
especially among Southeast Asian countries, the epicenter of H5N1 AI outbreak.
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Introduction
To date, 17 hemagglutinin (HA) and nine neuraminidase (NA)
subtypes of influenza A viruses have been identified. All the HA
and NA subtypes have been isolated from wild aquatic birds,
particularly from orders Anseriformes (ducks, geese, and swans) and
Charadriiformes (gulls, terns, and shorebirds). Therefore, aquatic
birds are widely accepted as the main natural reservoirs of
influenza A viruses. Influenza viruses isolated from these birds are
the mostly avirulent, low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) viruses
[1–3].
Only some members of the H5 and H7 subtypes are highly
pathogenic, but the H5N1 viruses were more virulent [1,3]. In the
first identified occurrence of H5N1 HPAI infection in humans in
Hong Kong in 1997, 18 humans were infected and 6 died (case
fatality rate 33.3%) [4]. The HPAI H5N1 virus re-emerged in
Hong Kong in 2001, twice in 2002, and subsequently in 2003 in
poultry, waterfowl and wild birds [5]. The viruses isolated in Hong
Kong before 2002 were pathogenic in gallinaceous birds but not
domestic or wild waterfowl. Death of aquatic birds from the HPAI
H5N1 virus was first recognized in the 2002 outbreak [5]. The
resurging HPAI H5N1 strain is highly virulent in both avian and
humans, with a fatality rate of approximately 60% being reported
in infected humans [6,7]. In January 2004, an outbreak of H5N1
HPAI was reported in poultry and humans in Thailand. The virus
initially isolated in Thailand belonged to clade 1; while clade 2.3.4
virus was introduced into northeast Thailand in 2006 [8,9].
However, all of the virus isolates in central Thailand still remained
in clade 1. There were 25 cases reported in humans, with 17
deaths (case fatality rate 68%). No cases of human infection have
occurred since August 2006, but there were some avian influenza
virus (AIV) outbreaks in poultry until 2008 [6,7].
Based on virological data and satellite telemetry studies, many
groups of investigators have linked migratory birds with H5N1
HPAI spread [10–17]. The first evidence that supported this claim
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was an outbreak of genotype z, clade 2 H5N1 viruses that
occurred in wild bird populations at Qinghai Lake, western China
during late April until June 2005 causing death of more than six
thousand birds. The main victim infected were Bar-headed geese
(Anser indicus) which accounted for more than 50% of the deaths,
whereas Brown-headed gulls (Larus brunnicephalus, Family Laridae),
were the second most species affected [10,11]. Subsequently,
H5N1 HPAI viruses similar to those in the Qinghai area were also
isolated in other Asian countries, Europe, the Middle East and
some African countries [2]. H5N1 viruses were likely transmitted
along the flyways of birds that shared habitats, wintering sites,
breeding areas or stopovers [2,15]. In addition, the results from
surveillance for H5N1 HPAI in migratory and wildlife birds in 14
provinces of China from 2004 to 2007 showed that highest
infection rates (4.37%) occurred in mallards; while it was 2.39%
for Brown-headed gulls [18]. Birds in the Qinghai province had
the highest rates of infection, possibly because there are many lake
areas in Qinghai, which are natural habitats and breeding ground
of numerous bird species [11,18]. Therefore, AI spread between
birds sharing the same water rich habitats is more common.
Investigation of the outbreaks and phylogenetic analysis suggested
that the migrating birds in Qinghai got infected with H5N1 HPAI
viruses through transmission from domestic poultry [11].
Satellite telemetry has been conducted by several groups of
investigators to study the potential role of migrants in H5N1 HPAI
spread [14–17]. With this technique, flyways of migrants can be
illustrated with high accuracy; and the linkage between bird
locations and geographical areas of AI outbreaks can be
determined. Spatial analysis of distance of migration, duration of
asymptomatic infection and duration of viral shedding strongly
supported potential role of migratory birds on H5N1 HPAI
spread. However, those satellite telemetry studies explored the
flyways which spanned Africa, Europe and East Asia, while none
involved flyways to Southeast Asia which was the epicenter of the
outbreaks.
The Brown-headed gull is one of the most common bird species
to annually visit Thailand, staying from October to May [19–22].
According to the Department of National Parks, Wildlife and
Plant Conservation of Thailand, there are 2 large flocks of Brown-
headed gulls in Thailand. The larger flock consists of approxi-
mately 5,000 birds foraging around the inner gulf of Thailand
mainly at mangrove mudflats in the Bang Poo Rest and
Rehabilitation Center of the Royal Thai Army, Samut Prakan
province (Figure 1). The Department of Park, Wildlife and Plant
Conservation by support from our group at the Faculty of
Veterinary Science, Mahidol University isolated HPAI H5N1
virus from 1 of 23 gulls from this flock in 2005, none of 47 gulls in
2006 and 2007 and 3 of 83 gulls in 2008. Collectively, 4 of 153
(2.6%) apparently healthy birds in this flock harbored HPAI
H5N1 virus infection. This data had been reported in Thai in the
Wildlife yearbook, Department of Park, Wildlife and Plant
Conservation. Source and place of infection in this flock of gulls
is not known; nevertheless, the infected, apparently healthy gulls
may further spread the HPAI virus along its flyways. However, the
entire migratory route of Brown-headed gulls remains unknown.
In order to determine the potential role of this bird species on AI
spread along its migratory path, satellite telemetry was employed
to track the flyways of Brown-headed gulls during 2008–2011. We
searched for linkage between bird locations and occurrence of
reported H5N1 HPAI outbreak while the birds overwintered in
Thailand. Status of H5N1 HPAI infection in the flock was also
determined. Gulls in captivity were challenged with H5N1 HPAI
virus. Duration of viral shedding, tolerability of gulls to survive the
infection till death together with the data on the distance and time
spent on migration were explored in order to investigate the
supportive role of gulls on AI spread along their migratory routes.
Results
Migratory routes and flight distances of Brown-headed
gulls
Eight Brown-headed gulls employed in the satellite telemetry
study were captured from the flock at the Bang Poo study site,
Samut Prakarn province, Thailand (Figure 1). They were of adult
age, negative for influenza virus infection (see Materials and
Methods), physiological healthy and energetic. Tagging the birds
with satellite transmitters was performed in two consecutive years.
The first Brown-headed gull was tagged in March 2008; and the
other 7 gulls were tagged between February and March 2009.
Flyways of these gulls were monitored until the satellite signals
were lost. Demographic data and duration of tracking of each bird
are shown in Table 1. Two gulls (I.Ds. 74795 and 88216)
completed one migratory cycle, 3 gulls (I.Ds. 88215, 91416 and
91417) completed 2 cycles (Table 2); while 3 gulls (I.Ds. 88217,
88218 and 91418) were lost in Thailand within one month after
tagging (Table 1). Flyways of the 5 marked gulls including their
geographical locations in different countries are as shown in
Figure 1. Flock of Brown-headed gulls and a gull fitted with
satellite transmitter at the Bang Poo study site.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0049939.g001
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Table 3, and individual flyway of each gull was described in detail
in Supporting Information S1.
The mean flying distance of the tagged gulls during migration
from Thailand to China was 202 km/day (165–342 km/day at
95% CI) and it was 173 km/day (115–311 km/day at 95% CI)
from China to Thailand; whereas the local movements within a
given site was 7 km/day (1–12 km/day at 95% CI) in Thailand
and 9 km/day (3–16 km/day at 95% CI) in China (Table 2). In
general, gulls traveled an estimated migratory distance of
2,400 km between China and Thailand with duration of migration
of approximately 12 days in average (7–23 days at 95% CI).
Although all gulls began their flight from the same study site in
Thailand, their destinations in China were different. They also
arrived and left Thailand at different time points. These results
indicated that these Brown-headed gulls belong to different flocks
while they were in China, and just gathered together in the same
overwintering site in Thailand. Migratory routes of the 5 tracked
gulls spanned 7 countries- Thailand, Myanmar, India, China,
Bangladesh, Vietnam and Cambodia (Figure 2). Almost all tracked
gulls, except gull I.D. 88216, stayed in Cambodia for approxi-
mately 30–40 days in a migratory season (Table 3); and only the
gull I.D. 91417 had traveled further to Vietnam. If seasonal
habitat is defined as the places where gulls stayed for longer than 1
month, those places were mainly located in three countries: China,
Thailand and Cambodia; while Myanmar, India, Bangladesh and
Vietnam were considered to be the stopover countries. Moreover,
the stopover places of individual gull in each country were
different. They could be West Bengal or Assum in India, the Gulf
of Martaban, Ayeyarwaddy or Rakhine in Myanmar and Kien
Giang in Vietnam. In the three gulls that were tracked for over
two migratory cycles, the migratory routes were only slightly
different between years.
Ecologically, seasonal habitats were always along the coast,
wetlands or inland lakes (Figure 3). Birds stayed over the cold
season for 5–6 months in Thailand and stayed in their breeding
places in China for another 5–6 months. Duration that gulls stayed
in each country is shown in Figure 4. Seasonal habitats in
Thailand were mainly in three provinces: Samut Prakan, Samut
Sakhon and Samut Songkhram, all of which were situated along
the inner gulf of Thailand. In China, the breeding habitats were in
Tibet, Qinghai and Xinjiang. However, gulls also spent their times
at a third habitat in Siem Reap, Cambodia around Tonle Sap, the
largest fresh water lake in Southeast Asia [23]. Although this flock
of gulls stayed through winter along the inner gulf of Thailand, no
AIV outbreak was reported in that area through the extensive
national surveillance system.
Prevalence of avian influenza virus infection in gulls
A total of 75 birds were captured from the Bang Poo study site
during January to March of 2008, 2009 and 2010. Throat and
cloacal swabs as well as blood samples were collected for the
investigation of influenza virus infection. No influenza virus was
isolated and the viral genome was not detected in cloacal and
throat swab samples. The H5N1 antibody was not detected in the
hemagglutination-inhibition (HI) and microneutralization (Mi-
croNT) assays. However, 6.6% of samples were positive for the
pan-influenza A antibody by ELISA.
Tolerability of gulls to HPAI H5N1 virus infection
Brown-headed gulls kept in captivity were inoculated with
HPAI H5N1virus in order to explore whether the infected birds
could survive the infection, and therefore might be able to carry on
migratory activity. Group of 3 gulls was inoculated with the H5N1
virus at the inoculum dose of 10, 103 or 104 tissue culture infective
dose 50 (TCID50) per head (Table 4). The result demonstrated
that with the high inoculum dose of 103 or 104 TCID50 all
inoculated gulls began shedding the virus intermittently in cloacae
and trachea after 1–2 days post- inoculation (dpi.). As determined
by RT-PCR, titers of the viruses shed from trachea from the first
day of detection to the day of death were at range of 105 to 106
copies/ml or undetectable; and the tracheal specimens were also
positive for virus isolation in Madin Darby canine kidney (MDCK)
cell cultures (Table 4). The virus shed from cloacae was detected
by the isolation method only, but not by RT-PCR with sensitivity
of detection of 98 copies/reaction. The birds inoculated with these
two inoculums doses could tolerate the infection and died between
day 4 and day 6 post-inoculation. At one day before death,
apparent clinical symptoms such as ataxia, ventral recumbence,
depression, ruffled feather and shaking head were noticed.
Regarding the inoculums dose of 10 TCID50, 1 of 3 inoculated
gulls could shed the virus from cloacal sample only at 3 dpi. as
determined by isolation method only. On day 4, virus shedding
was also detected from tracheal sample by isolation method only.
This bird showed symptom of ataxia on day 6 and died on day 7.
Necropsy of this bird showed brain congestion and ecchymatic
hemorrhage in gizzard. The two gulls that survived the infection
neither shed the virus nor developed any clinical symptom, of
which one of them underwent seroconversion.
Discussion
The worldwide resurgence of H5N1 HPAI since 2003 has
resulted in massive deaths in poultry and human deaths, especially
Table 1. Demographic data of the tracked gulls.
Bird I.D. Sex Body weight (g) Marking date
Time at signal loss
from monitoring Place at signal loss Tracking period
74795 ND 475 Mar 25, 2008 Dec 2008 Cambodia 9 mos.
88215 Male 650 Mar 26, 2009 Mar 2011 Thailand 2 yrs.
88216 Female 600 Mar 13, 2009 May 2010 Tibet 1 yr, 2 mos.
88217 ND 450 Feb 17, 2009 Mar 2009 Thailand ,1 mo.
88218 Female 500 Mar 26, 2009 Apr 2009 Thailand ,1 mo.
91416 ND 440 Feb 17, 2009 Jan 2011 Cambodia 1 yr, 11 mos.
91417 ND 430 Feb 17, 2009 Nov 2010 Thailand 1 yr, 9 mos.
91418 ND 400 Feb 17, 2009 Mar 2009 Thailand ,1 mo.
ND=Not determined.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0049939.t001
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in East and Southeast Asian countries. Integrated data and
phylogenetic analyses of virus isolates obtained from different
geographical locations suggest that the H5N1 spread throughout
Asian and African countries involved both migratory birds and
trade in poultry, whereas the spread in European countries
involved migratory birds [24]. Human population, duck popula-
tion (particularly, free grazing ducks) and intensity of the rice crop
can increase the risk of propagation of H5N1 HPAI in Southeast
Asian countries [25,26]. There is a close relationship between the
density of free grazing ducks and the double or triple cultivation of
rice in Thailand, because the falling rice grains left in the fields
after harvesting are the source of low-cost food for ducks.
Movements of free grazing ducks to post-harvested rice fields
has been suggested as the major source of virus spread in Thailand
during the initial waves of HPAI outbreaks. Nevertheless, duck
movement has been later on prohibited. Natural infection in the
other animal species such as tigers and leopards, cats, and dog was
mainly caused by ingestion of infected carcasses or chicken meat
[27–30]. However, most cases of H5N1 HPAI infection in humans
in Thailand were mainly caused by exposure to sick or dead
chicken.
It has been very difficult to trace back how the H5N1 HPAI
virus was introduced into Thailand because of the delay between
the initial cases and the subsequent spread of the virus throughout
of the country [31]. It has been hypothesized that the virus might
have been introduced via migratory birds. HPAI usually occurs
during low temperature months (October to February) which
coincide with the time of arrival of wintering migratory birds [31].
In our study, Brown-headed gulls seem to be a prime candidate
species for spreading avian influenza. They are long distant
migrant and their flyways involved 7 countries, all of which had
been affected by the H5N1 HPAI. Nevertheless, on the basis of an
inhabiting time of 1 month or longer, only China, Thailand and
Cambodia, were considered to be the gulls’ seasonal habitats,
whereas Myanmar, Bangladesh, India and Vietnam were stopover
places. In our study, Brown-headed gulls spent their breeding time
in the lake areas of Tibet, Qinghai and Xinjiang. All of these
breeding sites are cold and high altitude lakes of varying salinity
[21]. They migrated to warmer places and stayed overwinter in
mudflats along the inner gulf of Thailand and Tonle Sap Lake
areas in Cambodia.
Our study illustrates complete migratory cycles of Brown-
headed gulls. Gulls in this flock arrived and left Thailand
asynchronously; their destinations on migration to China were
different, suggesting that they belonged to different flocks while in
China. Gulls from these flocks gathered together during the winter
time in Thailand. The first group of gulls reached the Bang Poo
study site in October and the last group left in May. The migration
distance of about 2400 km between Thailand and China and the
migration time at range of 5–23 days in our tracked Brown-
headed gulls were more or less similar to those previously reported
in wildfowl in which the movements of up to 2,900 km in 5–15
days were within the timeframe that was compatible with the
preclinical symptom and virus dispersal [16].
We looked for a linkage between the virus from the Qinghai
outbreaks and the H5N1 HPAI viruses isolated from Brown-
headed gulls in Thailand in 2005 and 2008, but no linkage was
found. Phylogenetic analysis showed that the viruses isolated from
birds in Qinghai in 2005 belonged to clade 2.2 [10,11], whereas
the viruses isolated from gulls in Thailand between 2005 and 2008
belonged to clade 1 (unpublished data). Nevertheless, phylogenetic
analysis showed a virological linkage between countries situated in
the migratory corridor of this flock of Brown-headed gulls. The
viruses causing outbreaks in Bangladesh belonged to the Qinghai
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like-lineage [32]; and the viruses causing the first epidemic wave in
Thailand, Cambodia and Vietnam belonged to clade 1 [8,33].
The clade 1 virus was originally isolated in Yunnan, southern
China in 2002 and 2003, and probably spread to Vietnam by
poultry trade across the shared border that is 600 km long [34].
Thereafter, the viruses spread from the North to the South of
Vietnam. Interestingly, the H5N1 virus isolates in Thailand are
closely related to the isolates in Vietnam [6]. It is also claimed that
Table 3. Habitats of the tracked gulls.
Length of stay (days)
Bird I.D. Location 2008 2009 2010 2011 Average
74795 Thailand: Samut Prakan, Samut Sakhon 44 - - - -
China: Qinghai, Xinjiang, Tibet 174 - - - -
Cambodia: Siem Reap 35 - - - -
88215 Thailand: Samut Prakan, Samut Songkhram - 90 119 61 90
China: Xinjiang, Tibet - 170 180 - 175
Cambodia: Pursat, Siem Reap - - 40 (02/12/10 -11/01/11) -
88216 Thailand : SamutPrakan, SamutSongkhram,
Chachoengsao
- 90 98 - 94
China: Tibet - 183 - - -
91416 Thailand :SamutSongkhram - 64 101 - 82
China: Tibet - 201 189 - 195
Cambodia: Kampong Thom, Pursat, Siem Reap - - 42 (19/11/10 - 10/01/11) -
91417 Thailand : Samut Prakan, Samut Songkhram - 83 78 - 81
China: Qinghai, Xinjiang - 146 180 - 163
Cambodia: Kampong Thom, Pursat, Siem Reap - 32 (25/12/09- 25/01/10) - -
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0049939.t003
Figure 2. Migratory routes of all study gulls. (A) Gull I.D. 74795; (B) Gull I.D. 88215; (C) Gull I.D. 88216; (D) Gull I.D. 91416; and (E) Gull I.D. 91417.
Color stars indicate the stopover places.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0049939.g002
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the clade 1 virus spread from Thailand to Cambodia [34].
Nevertheless, it remains unknown for how the clade 1 virus was
introduced into Thailand. The firstly H5N1 HPAI outbreaks in
Thailand occurred in central part, not at the border of the
country. Interestingly, Vietnam, Thailand and Cambodia reported
the first outbreak in the country at about the same period of time
in 2004, i.e., on January 23 for Thailand, on January 8 for
Vietnam, and January 24 for Cambodia [6]. Although there might
be a lag time period for outbreak identification and report, it is
implied that the H5N1 HPAI outbreaks occurred in these
countries more or less about the same time. In addition, the time
at occurrence of outbreaks in these 3 countries coincides with the
overwintering period of Brown-headed gulls.
Figure 3. Ecological characteristics of habitats in each country involving the inland lakes and coastal areas.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0049939.g003
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Our study showed that Brown-headed gulls kept in captivity
were vulnerable to HPAI H5N1 virus. Nevertheless, gulls infected
with the inoculum dose of 104 TCID50 could survive for 4–5 days
and those inoculated with 103 TCID50 could survive for 5–6 days,
and with viral shedding from trachea and cloacae which began
after 1 dpi. In addition, a gull infected with the low inoculum dose
of 10 TCID50 could survive for 7 days with viral shedding which
began at 3 dpi. Apparent clinical symptoms were noticed at just
one day before death indicating that the infected gulls may be able
to complete migratory route between China and Thailand, or at
least, at a shorter distant between nearby countries. Gulls
inhabited and stopover in water rich areas where numerous
domestic and migratory bird species can be found [22,35,36];
therefore, the infected gulls might be able to spread the virus to the
other birds foraging in the same vicinity.
Although cross border trade may be the major route of H5N1
HPAI virus spread in Asian countries, it cannot be excluded that
migratory birds might also play an additional role in the spread of
the virus across countries or domestically along its flyways. In spite
of the fact that Brown-headed gulls appear to be an ideal
candidate for spreading the virus, no H5N1 virus including other
influenza subtypes could be isolated, and no H5N1 antibody could
be detected in our flock of Brown-headed gulls during the study
period. Only anti-influenza antibody was detected by ELISA,
indicating previous infection with some subtype of AIVs in these
birds. Besides waterfowl, gulls and shorebirds also maintain an
influenza gene pool in their species. Predominant AIV subtypes
found in gulls are H13 and H16 [2].
The inability to detect the H5N1 virus, however, may simply be
due to our small sample size collected from gulls as all migratory
birds in Thailand are protected by law; and it may be also due to
the absence of HPAI outbreaks during our investigation period of
2008–2011. There was only one outbreak occurred in poultry in
Nakhon Sawan and Phichit provinces (upper part of central
Thailand) in January 2008, and one in backyard poultry in
Sukhothai province (lower north of the country in November
2008). No AI outbreak has been reported since then [6]. Satellite
telemetry was conducted in Bar headed geese and Ruddy
Shelducks in Qinghai Lake, China and also in Chilika Lagoon
and Khunthankulum Reserves, India in order to determine
correlation between flying route and HPAI H5N1 outbreak in
South Asia [37]. Nevertheless, this study is the first flyway
monitoring of the Brown-headed gulls that covered complete
migratory seasons and encompassed the epicenter of H5N1 HPAI
in Southeast Asia which has never been reported before.
Materials and Methods
Approvals and permissions
This study was approved by the Animal Care and Use
Committee of the Faculty of Veterinary Science, Mahidol
University, and compiled with the Statement of Compliance
(Assurance) with Standards for Humane Care and Use of
Laboratory Animals of the Office of Laboratory Animal Welfare
(OLAW No. A5731-01), U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services. The study was carried out with permission of the
Department of National Parks, Wildlife and Plant Conservation,
Thailand, in accordance with the Wildlife Conservation Act of
Thailand.
Study site
This study was conducted at Bang Poo, a recreation area
located in the Samut Prakan province, Thailand, 37 km east of
Bangkok. This 63 km2 coastal area owned by the Royal Thai
Army is a part of the inner gulf of Thailand and comprised
mangrove and large mudflat habitats. Gulls gather together here
to feed on an abundance number of clams that embedded in the
muddy beaches. Bang Poo is an Important Bird Areas (IBA) with
more than 135 water bird species being recorded, including 7
species of ducks, 50 species of waders, and 18 species of terns and
gulls. Thirteen globally threatened species have been recorded in
this area [22]. The Brown-headed gull is an important species in
this wetland IBA [19–22].
Study birds
The Brown-headed gull (Larus brunnicephalus) is a waterfowl
belonging to the family Laridae. The common name for this species
comes from the presence of brown color on the head of adult
birds. These gulls normally feed on small fishes and crabs;
nevertheless, they can adapt to a variety of available foods.
Bird capture and specimen collection
All migratory birds in Thailand are protected animals by law.
Therefore, bird capture was performed by the authorized persons
from the Department of National Park, Wildlife and Plant
Conservation. Gulls were attracted by fried pork rind, and
captured by a hand net. Approximately 10–20 birds were captured
Figure 4. Duration of stay of each gull in various countries.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0049939.g004
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in each trap. Oropharyngeal/tracheal and cloacal swabs as well as
blood samples were collected for laboratory investigations to
determine the prevalence of AIV infection. The captured birds
were also physically examined for general health conditions (body
weight, body size) and the healthy, energetic adults that were
negative for influenza viral infection, as screened by rapid antigen
detection kit (Rapid H5 AIV Ag Test, Bionote, Inc., Gyeonggi-Do,
South Korea) at the study site, were chosen for satellite telemetry
tracking. Results of samples negative for the virus infection by
antigen detection were confirmed at the Virology Laboratory at
the Faculty of Veterinary Science, Mahidol University.
Satellite telemetry technique and data analysis
Eight gulls negative for influenza antigen were chosen for the
satellite telemetry study. The first gull was marked in March 2008
and the second lot of 7 gulls was marked during February and
March 2009. Each bird was tagged with a ring band and fitted
with a solar powered satellite platform transmitters (solar PTT-
100, Microwave Telemetry, Inc., Columbia, MD) on its back by
using Teflon harnesses (Bally Ribbon Mills, Bally, PA). A
transmitter weighing 12 g was used for the first gull and
transmitters weighing 9.5 g were used for remaining 7 gulls. On
average, the transmitter packages weighed approximately 1.98%
of the bird’s body weight. After being marked, birds were released,
usually within 1 hour, to a place close to the capture sites.
The solar PTT-100 transmitter operates at frequency of
401.650 MHz. The standard duty cycle of the solar PTTs was
set at 10 hours on and 48 off for recharging the batteries. Signals
were processed and the data was provided by Argos CLS
(Toulouse, France). ‘‘Bird locations were analyzed at location
classes 1, 2 or 3 only and mapped with Google Earth Program
version 5.1 (Google, Mountain View, CA, USA); and a precision
of less than 1500 meters error was obtained.’’
When the transmitter signal from any tracked bird was lost, the
observation was still going on for at least one more month before
concluding its disappearance.
Detection of H5N1 HPAI infection in study birds
Prevalence of influenza virus in this flock of gulls as well as the
confirmation of the negative results for influenza antigen detection
was determined by real time reverse transcription-polymerase
chain reaction (RT-PCR) for viral genome detection and the virus
isolation from throat and cloacal swab samples. Serological
techniques for detection of H5 antibody were performed by HI
and microNT assays; and that for detection of pan-influenza
antibody was performed by ELISA.
Real time RT-PCR. Protocols from the Organization des
Epizooties (http://www.oie.int/fr/normes/mmanual/2008/pdf/
2.03.04_AI.pdf) and/or those established by the U.S. Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) were used for viral genome
detection and subtype identification. Throat and cloacal swabs
from each bird were tested separately.
Virus isolation method. Cloacal and throat swab specimens
were separately inoculated in duplicate in embryonated chicken
eggs and MDCK cell monolayer. Amniotic/allantoic fluid and
culture supernatant were screened for presence of influenza virus
by hemagglutination with 0.5% goose red blood cells before
subjected to subtype identification by real time RT-PCR.
HI assay. The protocol for H5N1 antibody detection was
based on the method given for avian influenza in the World
Health Organization (WHO) manual on animal influenza
diagnosis and surveillance [38] in which 0.5% goose erythrocytes
were chosen as the indicator as previously described by
Louisirirotchanakul et al. [39]. The assay was performed in
micro-titer V plate in duplicate wells using replicating A/chicken/
Thailand/ICRC-V143/07(H5N1) (accession No. EU233413–
EU233420) at a final concentration of 4 hemagglutination units/
25 ml as the test antigen. Titer was defined as the highest serum
dilution that causes complete hemagglutination of the test
erythrocytes.
microNT assay. H5N1 antibody was detected by ELISA
based microNT assay using the protocols as described in the
WHO manual for avian influenza [38], and modified by
Louisirirotchanakul et al. [39] in which MDCK cell suspension
was replaced with MDCK cell monolayer. The assay was
performed in micro-titer plates in duplicate. A/chicken/Thai-
land/ICRC-V143/07(H5N1) at a final concentration of 100
TCID50 was used as the test virus. Viral nucleoprotein
synthesized was detected by a mouse monoclonal antibody
(Chemicon International, Inc., Tecumala, CA) as the primary
antibody together with horse radish peroxidase-conjugated rabbit
anti-mouse Ig (Dako Cytomation, Denmark) as the secondary
antibody. Titer was defined as the highest serum dilution that
causes a 50% reduction in the amount of viral nucleoprotein
synthesized.
ELISA. Sera were assayed for antibody to influenza A viruses
(pan-influenza A subtypes), using the type A influenza multi
species antibody test kit (AI MSp) (BioChek, London, UK)
according to the manufacturer’s instructions.
Experimental HPAI H5N1 virus infection
To study whether infected birds could survive the infection and
still be able to carry on migratory activity, wild birds were trapped
and kept in captivity for a week prior to viral inoculation. These
gulls were negative for influenza virus infection as tested by RT-
PCR and virus isolation method. A/Brown-head gull/Thailand/
VSMU-28-SPK/2005(H5N1) which was isolated from an appar-
ently healthy looking gull in the surveillance study of HPAI H5N1
virus infection in wildlife birds was used as the challenging virus.
Each bird was intranasal inoculated with a 100 ml volume of an
inoculum dose of 10, 103 or 104 TCID50. Inoculated birds were
kept in an isolator in an animal biosafety laboratory level 3,
Faculty of Veterinary Science, Mahidol University. Tracheal and
cloacal swab specimens were collected daily till death. Each swab
sample was kept in 2 ml of viral transport media and kept frozen at
280 C until tested. Birds were also observed daily for signs,
symptoms and death until one month after inoculation.
Supporting Information
Supporting Information S1 Individual flyway of each 5
marked gull was described in details in supporting
information.
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